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"That it is necessary for the national defense and for
the proper growth of its foreign and domestic commerce that
the United states shall have a merchant marine of the best
equipped and most suitable types of vessels sufficient to
carry the greater portion of its commerce and serve as a
naval or military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency, ultimately to be owned and operated privately by citizens of the United states; and it is hereby declared to be
the policy of the United states to do whatever may be necessary to develop and encourage the maintenance of such a
merchant marine, and, insofar as may not be inconsistent
with the express provisions of this Act, the United states
Shipping Board shall, in the disposition of vessels and shipping property as hereinafter provided, in the making of rules
and regulations, and in the administration of the shipping
laws keep always in view this purpose and object as the primary end to be obtained."
Section I, Merchant Marine Act
of 1920
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INTRODUCTION

How important is the U.S. Merchant Marine to the government and people of the United States?

How much should be

sacrificed in favor of the continued existence of the merchant marine?

These are not fair questions because there are

no precise "correct" answers, nor need there be any.

To put

a price tag on the merchant marine is unnecessary, and the
pricing process is likely to be unrealistic, incomplete, and
sUbject to widely diverse interpretation.

Benefit/cost ana-

lyses with dollar cost estimates of various government aid
programs have been published, but truly quantifiable total
costs and benefits of the merchant marine are virtually impossible to derive at the present due to the lack of sufficient information and inflated or prejUdicial reports.

What

is really important is described concisely in the following:
"It has been decided that the United
States will have a merchant marine.
It will be required to operate only
expensive or inefficient tonnage,
and its consequent high ship and
labor costs will be offset by some
form of government support. This
has been basically a political
decision. ,,1
Despite great expense and the declining state of our
merchant marine industry, there will be considerable support
for the idea of maintaining and restoring the U.S. Merchant
Marine for some time to come.

Realizing this, the question

now becomes, "If we are committed to the support of the U.S.
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Merchant Marine, how can we make this support effective and
the merchant marine more efficient and competitive?"

It

would be ambitious to treat the entire subject of aid to the
merchant marine.

This discussion will concentrate on the

form of federal aid known as Cargo Preference, as this has
become the principal (if not the most costly) form of federal assistance applicable to all U.S. flag vessels.
Leading with a brief discussion of the need for federal
aid in general, the background, impact, and prospects for the
future of cargo preference will be examined.

It will be

demonstrated that federal aid, particUlarly in the form of
Cargo Preference,is required to maintain the merchant
marine.

It will also be demonstrated that federal aid and

policy in its present form is not sufficient to promote
growth.

There needs to be significant improvement in this

area if the maritime industry is to become a successful and
vital force once again.

Though cargo preference comprises

only one part of the government's program, it serves to illustrate what is both good and bad about the conditions
under which the U.S. Merchant Marine exists.
"the international political and economic
benefits associated with U.S. shipping
might not individually warrant federal support ... the collective value of these benefits is substantial and represents a major
offset against the cost to the Nation of
maintaining the essential maritime resource needed for security purposes."2
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II.

IS FEDERAL AID NECESSARY?

Since the United States Merchant Marine was instituted,
"the thread of government policy used to strengthen the
nation's maritime industries was rarely broken."J_This continuing assistance by the federal government has occurred
for several very logical reasons.

Primarily it is understood

that, "national defense, development of commerce, and protection of American interests, ,,4 are paramount.

Of those

reasons, the national defense/security role of the merchant
marine is generally agreed to be the most tangibly important
and in itself may provide sufficient justification for
government support. 5
"The most compelling justification of a
government-supported merchant marine is
position as a military auxiliary .•. the
experience of two World Wars and Viet
Nam has convinced many observers ••. of
the military value of a merchant marine.,,6
It makes sense that for security purposes and during wartime or national emergency the U.S. would desire to exclusively utilize U.S. flag vessels for the carriage of military
and sensitive cargoes.

Without a U.S. Merchant Marine, the

country would have to depend on the whims of foreign merchants, which would be a ludicrous policy.

Even the critics

of the merchant marine recognize its inestimable worth as a
component of national security.
From an economic viewpoint, the U.S. Merchant Marine does

J

contribute in a small, yet favorable way to the nation's balance of payments.

Other claimed benefits include maintenance

of a source of employment and the presence of an industrial
infrastructure.? Overall, the economic argument is weak, but
the weakness of the economic argument provides a strong
reason for federal support.

Due to the inability of the mer-

chant marine to compete on its own and our commitment towards
having a merchant marine, the necessity of federal assistance becomes apparent.
"If an American industry is to compete internationally,
it must somehow offset the additional costs associated with
operating within the U.S. economy."S

This "offset" comes

through federal aid to the merchant marine and may assume
various forms (see Table 1).

Federal assistance is always

costly, but, "In an industry as highly competitive as international shipping, any government that desires to maintain a
national flag merchant fleet literally has no option but to
adopt some of the •.. practices.,,9

Because the United States

Merchant Marine has to trade in an international

environment~

it is important to understand the nature of that environment.
"International shipping does not operate in a free and
open market.

It has never done so."lO

Though this fact may

seem obvious to most observers, some of the country's policymakers unbelievably have little knowledge of the extent of
this tremendous hurdle which faces U.S. flag

vessels.

Free-

dom in the international shipping market is the ideal situations, but is prevented from existing by one or more of the
following practices:
4

TABLE 1
Summary of Major GovernmentJrograms
Body of
Progr~s
Enforcement
Construction
Maritime Subsidy
Differential Subsidy
Board-MarAd
(CDS) (Title V)
_ n' _, ,

Recipients
All U.S. Citizen
U.S. flag
vessels in the
foreign commerce
of the U.S.

Operating Differential
Subsidy (ODS) (Title
VI)

Maritime Subsidy
MarAd

Mortgage Guarantee
(Title XI)

Division of Ship
Financing
Guarantees-MarAd

Construction Loan
Guarantee

Division of Ship
Guarantees-MarAd

Cargo Preference

PL-480, Dept of
All U.S. flag
Agriculture,
vessels (inAID, Dept of
cluding subState, Other
sidized)
government cargoes,
various departments
such as Defense

U.S. flag vessels
operating on essential foreign
trade routes '
(liners) since
1970 also bulk
carriers
All U.S. built
vessels (ocean
and inland)

1974
Approximate
Annual Cost
$199 million

$258 million

Up to 87.5% of
actual costs
(75% for subsidized) $7
billion 25-year
financing program
limit (1975)

All U.S. built
vessels receiving Title XI
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$400 million

Major Purpose or
Requirement
Up to 50% of
cost for com-f)etitive' bd..dding
contracts, 35%
for negotiated
contracts
Cost parity payments covering
differential
cost of crew
(repair and
maintenance
until 1975) etc
U.S. construe..;
tion for U.S.
flag vessel
operation

U.S. construction for U.S.
flag vessel
operation
Government
ownedcandy'or-

financed cargo

continued TABLE 1
Capital Construction
Fund (tax exempt)

Internal Revenue
Service

All,U.S. citizen
owners who are
qualified operators

Ship Exchange Program

Office of Domestic
Shipping-MarAd

All U.S. citizen
owners who are
qualified
operators

Ship Trade In Program

Office of Domestic
Shipping-MarAd

All U.S. citizen
owners who are
qualified operators

Investment Tax Credit

Internal Revenue
Service

Research and
ment

Admin for Commercial
Development-MarAd

All U.S. citizen owners
who are qualified
operators
All U.S. maritime
$32 million
industry, most programs now based on
cost sharing
U.S. flag vessels without subsidy

Develop~

Cabotage

Jones Act, MarAd

War Risk Insurance

MarAd (expired 1975)

$24 million

$6 million

No withdrawal except for purposes
of ship replacement
U.S. built vessels
or U.S. flag vessels may be exchanged for others
in NDRF
Subsidized operators
trade in replacement vessel upon
delivery of new
subsidized ship
Investment in new
or used ships

Restriction of
vessels to
domestic routes

All vessels in U.S. trade

Sourcer U.S. Maritime Administration and Frankel, Ernst G. Regulation and Policies of American Shipping.
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Subsidies;

"

- Open and hidden rebates
to shippers;
- Shipping discriminations;
- Cargo reservations for
national flag ships;
- "Open" and "closed" conferences to regulate
freight rates on specific
trade routes;
- Rate wars; and
- Bilateral shipping agreements ... ,,11
Additionally the appearance of state-owned shipping companies
(particularly Eastern Bloc states) has had a profound effect
on the flow of trade and the pricing structure of shipping. 12
All maritime nations exert some supportive influence on their
own maritime industries, and most forms of aid are more extensive than those espoused by the United States.

It seems fair

that a country would desire to ensure the success of its own
merchant marine.

To achieve this success, foreign interests

have been furthered by the use of what may be called "discriminatory" practices.

From Table 2 it may be seen that

Cargo Preference is the most popular type of assistance by
maritime nations to their shipping industries.

The "favorable

impact"l] that foreign Cargo Preference policies have upon
their maritime concerns is appreciable, While, "The U.S.
preference laws affect only a small fraction of the nation's
commerce. ,,14
In this initial discussion the need for federal aid and

7

TABLE 2
Subsidies and Other Types of Assistance Which Nations
Gave to Their Maritime Industries in 1978
Subsidies
Low
Operating
Construction
Interest
Interest Loans

Country
Algeria*
Argentina*
Australia*
Belgium
Brazil*
Canada
Chile*
Colombia
Cyprus
Denmark
Ecudor*
Egypt, Arab Republic of*
Finland
France*
Garbon*
Germany, Federal Republic of
Ghana*
Greece
India*
Indonesia*
Iran*
Iraq*
Ireland*
Israel*
Italy*
Japan
Korea, South
Kuwait*
Lebanon
Liberia*
Libya*
Malaysia*
Mexico*
Morocco*

x
**

x

X

X

**

X

Loans

X

X
X
X
X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X
X

X

X

X

**

X
X

X
X

**
**
***

X
X
X
X

X

X
X
X

X
X

X
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Continued TABLE 2
Country
Netherlands
New Zealand*
Nigeria
Norway
Pakistan*
Panama
Peru*
Philippines*
Portugal*
Saudi Arabia
Singapore*
South Africa*
Spain*
Sweden*
Switzerland
Taiwan*
Thailand*
Turkey*
United Arab Emirates*
United Kingdom.*
United States
Uruguay*
Venezuela*
Zaire

Operating

Subsidies
Construction

Interest

Low
Interest Loans

X

X

X

**
X

Loans

X

X
X

X

X

X

X
X

X
*~

X
X
X

X

X
X
X
X

**
X

X
X

X
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Continued TABLE 2
Tax Benefits
Country
Algeria*
Argentina*
Australia*
Belgium
X
Brazil*
X
Canada
Chile*
X
Colombia
X
Cyprus
X
Denmark
X
Ecuador*
Egypt, Arab Republic of*
X
Finland
X
France*
X
Garbon*
X
Germany, Federal Republic of
Ghana*
Greece
X
India*
Indonesia*
Iran*
Iraq*
X
Ireland*
X
Israel*
X
Italy*
Japan
X
Korea, South
Kuwait*
X
Lebanon
Liberia*
Libya*
Malaysia*'
Mexico*
Morocco*
X
Netherlands*
New Zealand*

Accelerated
Depreciation

Cargo
Preference

Cabotage
Restrictions

X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

Others
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X
X

X

X
X

X
X
X
X
-,
I

X
X
X

X

X
X

X
X
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Continued TABLE 2
Accelerated
Cargo
Cabotage
Tax Benefits
Country
Restrictions
others
Depreciation
Preference
X
Nigeria*
X
X
Norway
X
x
X
X
Pakistan*
X
X
X
Panama
X
X
X
X
Peru*
X
X
X
X
Philippines*
X
X
X
Portugal*
X
X
Saudi Arabia
X
X
Singapore
X
X
X
South Africa*
X
X
X
X
Spain*
X
X
Sweden*
X
Switzerland
X
X
Taiwan*
X
Thailand*
X
Turkey*
United Arab Emirates*
X
United Kingdom
X
X
United States
X
X
Uruguay*
X
X
X
Venezuela*
X
Zaire
X
*State owned shipping lines and/or shipbuilding enterprises whose residual losses are covered
by government funds. Complete data are not available for the Soviet and Eastern European
communist countries' maritime industries except to note they are owned and tightly controlled
by the state, as are those of the People's Republic of China and a number of the developing
countries National merchant marines of less than 150,000 gross tons are excluded in this
compilation.
**Operating subsidies are granted in the public interest to maintain passenger and/or cargo
services to outlying islands. Commercial operation, without SUbsidy, could not be maintained.
***"Encouragement subsidies" to maritime transportation operating or using Korean flag ships in
international trades which contribute to earnings or to conserve foreign currencies.
Source: This chart is based entirely on the data for each country compiled by the Office of International Activities, Maritime Government Printing Office, December 1978, and Heine, Irwin M.
The U.S. Maritime Industry in the National Interest.
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a strong shipping policy has been highlighted.

There is in

fact, little disagreement concerning the need for the government's support.

What then becomes the issue is the matter

of what types of assistance will work for the U.S.

Of all

forms of federal aid, it is believed that Cargo Preference
is the most universally palateable and the most consistent
with current trends of the "New Federalism" in U.S.
government.
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III.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CARGO PREFERENCE

WHAT IS CARGO PREFERENCE?
Cargo Preference is, "a massive system of indirect aid to
both the subsidized and non-subsidized operators ••• it completely supports the operation of the tramp and unsubsidized
liner fleets, and the subsidized lines are dependent on it for
much of their cargo.,,15

Preference cargo is generally govern-

ment-generated cargo of which a certain percentage is required
to move on home flag vessels.

There are two types of preference

which must be distinguished:
ROUTE PREFERENCE - preference cargo
moving on home flag vessels at internationally competitive rates.
RATE PREFERENCE - preference cargo
moving at rates above world market
rates.
The history of Cargo Preference in the U.S. is traceable through several key pieces of legislation.

This legis-

lation became slightly more extensive as the years went by,
but stopped far short of the kind of thorough Cargo Preference
practiced by some of the more successful maritime nations.
There have been heated debates over the extent and applicability of the Cargo Preference laws which have affected not
only the fate of these laws, but the fate of all U.S. maritime
legislation in recent years.

Cargo Preference re-surfaces as

a major issue each time some overhaul of the U.S. maritime
policy is considered.
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CARGO PREFERENCE LEGISLATION
1904 - Military Transportation Act:

"preference to U.S. flag

ships in the transportation of supplies for the Army and Navy
in direct support of American military establishments overseas.,,16
1934 - Public Resolution 17:

"where loans are made to foster

exports of agricultural and other products, provision shall be
made to carry them exclusively in U.S. flag ships.

An exception

would be permitted when the Maritime Administration certified
to the lending agency that such vessels were not available as
to numbers, tonnage capacity, sailing schedule, or at reasonable rates. ,,17
1936 - Merchant Marine Act:

"created certain classes of pre-

ference cargo - U.S. mail (Section 405, since repealed) and
federal employees required to travel on U.S. ships (Section
901a). ,,18
1954 - Public Law 480:

Agricultural Trade Development and

Assistance Act (subsequently amended by Food for Peace Act in
1966), "provides for the overseas shipment of surplus U.S.
agricultural commodities under four titles:
Title I

- Sales to foreign governments
for local currency;

Title II

- Famine or other urgent relief
assistance;

Title III - (a) Bartering of surplus commodities for strategic
materials for U.S. stockpiling programs; and
(b) The Food for Development
Program; and
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Title IV - Added in 1959, provides long-term
credit to friendly foreign nations
for purchase of agricultural
commodities. ,,19
Under this law, the Department of Agriculture, "pays a
differential to operators based on the difference between the
contract rate and the international rate,"ZO which is more of
a direct sUbsidy.
Public Law 664:

The Cargo Preference Act (or 50/50 Act),

incorporated as an amendment to the Merchant Marine Act of
1936 and itself amended in 1961, "intended to protect the
interests of liner or scheduled service, irregular or tramp
shipping, and tanker operations," and provides that, "at least
50 percent of the gross tonnage of certain government-generated
cargoes shall be transported on privately-owned U.S. flag
commercial vessels."Zl
1970 - Merchant Marine Act:

Cargo Preference remained essen-

tially unchanged, but direct subsidies were extended to bulk
carrier

operation~

preference.

inthe hopes of eventually eliminating rate

The Administration of the Cargo Preference laws

was placed under the Maritime Administration for monitoring
and standardization purposes.Z 3
1977 - Public Law 95-74:

Strategic Petroleum Reserve Program,

"50 percent of oil purchased overseas for the program must be
shipped on U.S. flag vessels."Z4
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THE CARGO PREFERENCE DEBATES
In the period from 1965 to 1970, there was an ongoing
battle to formulate government policy in the face of maritime
union unrest and the steady decline of the merchant marine.
This period was particulary significant in the fate of Cargo
Preference.

The debates that raged between interested parties

were illustrative of the typical bureaucratic policymaking process, and Cargo Preference emerged as a major issue that divided the maritime industry.

The debate continues to this

day on a different scale.
John Kilgour, in The U.S. Merchant Marine: National
Maritime/Policy and Industrial Relations, does an outstanding
job of presenting all the aspects of the policy debate occurring during the 1965 to 1970 period.

The following discussion

of the Cargo Preference degates is condensed from that work
and concentrates on the Cargo Preference implications.
KEY PLAYERS IN THE GREAT DEBATE

The Johnson Administration:

"pledged to come forward

with a program to revitalize the U.S. fleet.,,25
SIU-AMA:

The Seafarers' International Union-American

Maritime Association, representing the position of the unsubsidized shipping sector.

AMA's primary function is

lobbying. 26
NMU-CASL:

The National Maritime Union-Committee of

American Shipping Lines, representing the position of the
subsidized shipping sector.
Nicholas Johnson:

CASL is also a major lobby.2 7

Maritime Administrator from 1964 to

1966 "with no previous maritime experien~e."28
Alan Boyd:

Secretary of Transportation under the Johnson
Administration, also with no previous maritime experience. 29
16

Andrew Gibson:

Maritime Administrator under the Nixon

Administration with an intimate knowledge of the maritime
industry.JO
MAC:

Maritime Advisory Committee-representing a cross

section of labor and industry, formed to deal with policy
problems under the Johnson Administration. J l
IMTF:

Interagency Maritime Task Force-representing

concerned governments agencies, formed to assist MAC in
i
""
J2
ac h Lev
levlng
po 1"lCy d eC1Slons.

The Nixon Administration:

promised "remedial measures

far more constructive and far more comprehensive than those
of his predecessor. J J
The background to the debate began in 196J when President
Kennedy promised to supply grain to the U.S.S.R. after that
country's catastrophic crop failure.

The controversy over who

would ship the grain precipitated union dissention and
tially explosive situation.

~

poten-

The unions and the industry in

general wanted to ensure that they would receive their "fair
share" of the grain traffic.

To deal with this situation

President Johnson ordered the formation of a short-term
Grievance Committee and the long-term MAC to create future
policy.

The Grievance Committee failed largely as a result

, of its differences·.with the powerful SIU.

MAC was unable to

achieve any policy decisions and it soon became apparent that
something else was required.

The Secretary of Commerce then

ordered the formation of the IMTF to "assist" MAC.

In fact

the IMTF held an almost contrary position to MAC and served
more as a stimulus than a cooperative organization.

The

Maritime Administrator Nicholas Johnson, used the IMTF to
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further the position of the Administration and encountered
vehement opposition from SIU.
The IMTF published a proposal which shocked the maritime
industry.

In A New National Maritime Policy, the IMTF pro-

posed foreign building and the phasing out of all Cargo
Preference.

This had several very direct implications.

The

unsubsidized sector depended almost exclusively on Cargo Preference for its cargo and could not afford to have foreign
built ships in competition.

As a result, the SIU-AMA con-

tingent shot into action to counter the proposal and to make
Nicholas Johnson's position untenable.

Actually, it is thought

that the IMTF proposal made sense for the subsidized sector
although major restructuring would be required for the U.S.
Merchant Marine.

The prospect of the loss of a large part of

the unsubsidized sector and the shake-up of the rest of the
industry proved highly distasteful to the industry and its
Congressional "mouth-pieces."

The MAC, which had been pre-

viously inactive, felt obliged to pUblish its own proposal.
The MAC report, Maritime Policy and Program of the
United States, was "designed to generate agreement.,,3 4

What

the MAC report proposed was essentially the opposite of the
IMTF report, in that only U.S. building would be allowed and
only rate preference would be phased out (and that would
occur very gradually.)

The MAC report was remarkable in that

it almost achieved a concensus in the maritime industry, although it did little to propose improvement or changes in
U.S. policy.
Nicholas Johnson stood fast on his position, but was
fighting against all odds.

In his campaign to sell the IMTF

proposal, Johnson made many industry enemies and more than a
18

few diplomatic mistakes.

Due to intense pressure exerted by

the industry and its Congressional friends, Nicholas Johnson
was removed as Maritime Administrator.

The fight for foreign

building was taken up by Johnson's "understudy" and new
Secretary of Transportation Alan Boyd.
Boyd's appearance on the scene as a proponent of foreign
building marks the emergence of Cargo Preference as the central
issue.

Boyd proposed foreign building and retention of Cargo

Preference.

The retention of Cargo Preference was intended to

placate SIU-AMA.

What occurred as a result of this proposal was

the polarization of the two major unions SIU-AMA and NMU-CASL.
NMU-CASL favored the proposal because it served their interests
with lower cost

ships and the ensurance of cargo in the form

of Cargo Preference.

Unfortunately for Boyd, SIU-AMA was not

to be put off by the Cargo Preference concession.

Foreign

building was still unacceptable to SIU-AMA, and now the union
wanted to expand Cargo Preference to commodities such as oil
and sugar.

SIU-AMA was probably "feeling its oats" believing

that it could stall any progress in maritime policy until it
obtained its desires.

NMU-CASL was becoming increasingly

annoyed at the SIU-AMA stand and came out in favor of the
elimination of rate preference.

This would of course hurt only

the SIU-AMA contingent by denying them the higher-than-market
rates it depended on for existence.

The debate was in full

swing with SIU-AMA and NMU-CASL squaring off.
A further complication for SIU-AMA was the Department of
Defense's proposition of competitive bidding for cargo.

This

would leave the higher priced unsubsidized carriers high and
dry, while the NMU-CASL factions would be able to price their
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services at more competitive rates.

The SIU-AMA, which had

started out on the offensive, was now backed into a corner.

To

counter the threat of the NMU-CASL and the D.D.D. proposal,
SIU-AMA proposed the elimination of the "double subsidy" the
practice of subsidized carriers receiving the additional
fits of Cargo Preference.

bene~

What SIU-AMA wanted was for the

carriage of preference cargo by unsubsidized ships alone.
During this controversy, foreign building had been lost
as an issue and Cargo Preference had become the overriding
concern despite Alan Boyd's futile attempts to impose the
foreign building program.

Boyd was doomed to failure from the

beginning, learning little from the Nicholas Johnson lesson,
and was defeated before the Nixon Administration took over.
The Nixon Administration was heralded by considerable
optimism for the future of the U.S. Merchant Marine.

The

Administration had a fairly realistic approach to the problem
which was aided by the wise choice of Andrew Gibson as Maritime
Administrator.

Gibson had a great deal of first-hand know-

ledge of the industry and was an adept politician.

The Nixon

Administration was able'to pass the Merchant Marine Act of
1970 with Gibson's aid in soothing the feelings of labor and
industry.

The Merchant Marine Act of 1970 was a compromise in

in that it buried

the issue of foreign building and put the

elimination of rate preference as a long-term goal.

The

reason the Act was acceptable to SIU-AMA is that Gibson
promised that the unsubsidized bulk-trade operators would receive preference for subsidies under the Act's proposed
extension of subsidies.

The Act was still imperilled by the

NMU-CASL/SIU-AMA feud over the "double subsidy" issue.
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In a

deft political move, this issue was sidetracked by referring
it to the Maritime Subsidy Board, allowing the Act to pass.
Though this ended the period of the debate, the problems of
union rivalry and the Cargo Preference issue continue to the
present.

The "double subsidy" issue was decided in 1975 when

a court decision upheld the rule that a vessel receiving
Operating Differential Subsidy must carry at least 50% nonpreference cargo or experience a proportional reduction in its
subsidy.35
The most significant aspect of this debate is not the
personalities involved or even the period during which it
occurred.

The important feature of the debate is the at-

mosphere in which maritime policy was created.

The very

nature of the relationship between the maritime industry and
government has led to the decline of the U.S. Merchant Marine.
The intense combat between the different interests represented
caused them to forget the true goal of a strong U.S. Merchant
Marine which would be of benefit to all.

"As long as tunnel-

vision lobbying and administrative response continue as the
modus operandi for American policymaking, American shipping
and shipbuilding will continue to stagnate.,,3 6
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RECENT EVENTS IN CARGO PREFERENCE
Cargo preference has become a popular topic, although
the practice has gained a great deal of opposition for
reasons explained in the "Impact of Cargo Preference"
chapter of this discussion.

There are several significant

events which illustrate the trends in thinking about Cargo
Preference.

These events all deal with attempts to expand

the applicability of preference laws.
When in 19?0 the Maritime Administration was appointed
to "'keep watch" over Cargo Preference , it could be seen that
controversy was in the making.

It was thought at the time

that,the Maritime Administration's interests were linked too
closely with the fate of the merchant marine, and that the
Maritime Administration would be more likely to try to promote Cargo Preference for purposes of protection.

This proved

to be true, and the Maritime Administration established a Cargo
Preference Control Center tOc£Rsure compliance with the laws. 3 ?
This caused problems to say the least,

Primarily, the Maritime

Administration has no explicit authority over the application
of preference programs.

Disputes with affected agencies arose

as a result of the attempted enforcement of Cargo Preference
laws and the lack of clearly defined legal limitations.

The

Maritime Administration would like to see the Cargo Preference
laws applied to their maximum extent, but faces stiff opposition from producers of government-generated cargo who would
prefer to use cheaper foreign shipping.

The Maritime Admini-

stration has done a fair job in the processing of information
it receives on preference cargo but is severely limited by
other agencies' non-compliance or inability to report statistics.
22

In 1977 the Carter Administration, in trying to build
up the strategic Petroleum Reserve Program and to counter
the threat of the Energy Crisis, proposed increasing Cargo
Preference to cover all imported oil under H.R. 10)7.

The

requirement for U.S. flag vessels to carry 9.5 or )0 percent of the imported oil was considered.

Both proposals

were extremely costly in terms of the differential between
U.S. and world market rates.

H.R. 10)7 was overwhelmingly

defeated in Congress and the Strategic Petroleum Reserve
program itself was temporarily suspended in 1979.

Fueled

by this success, opponents of Cargo Preference have become
increasingly vocal.
In 1982, H.R. 4627 - a Port Developments bill - had
Cargo Preference provisions attached to it that rekindled
the old debate over the nature of such provisions.

In the

fight over the bill, the arguments against Cargo Preference
were that it was, "a protectionist wolf cloaked in the sheep's
clothing of national defense, "'and that,""its real purpose
was to prop up a sick American maritime industry, which cannot begin to compete with its foreign counterparts.,,)8

This

line of attack on the national security benefits of Cargo
Preference has become the party line for opponents of the
practice, most of whom have foreign ties or are even foreign
lobbies.

Domestic opponents such as the Justice Department

make the attack on the grounds that such practices are
market-disrupting influences and should be subject to
repeal under the anti-trust laws.

2)

Proponents of Cargo

Preference still maintain that the costs associated with it
are justifiable in terms of the "national defense benefits ••.
to be derived."J9
These events have brought Cargo Preference to a
critical point in its development,

Now an examination of

the real impact of Cargo Preference is required to make a
decision that is not emotionally involved or prejudiced
by vested interests.
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IV.

THE IIVIPACT OF CARGO PREFERENCE

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FEDERAL AID
It was previously asserted that federal aid to the U.S.
Merchant Marine was required to ensure its survival.

JUdging

from the performance of the merchant marine recently, it is
obvious that aid has not been as effective as it could have
been.

Table 3 demonstrates the decline of the carriage of

trade by the U.S. flag merchant fleet which has been quite
steady.

In its current form U.S. maritime policy is, in fact,

inhibiting the merchant marine and needs to be restructured
considerably.

In this chapter, drawbacks of current federal

programs will be briefly examined followed by an in-depth
discussion of the effectiveness of Cargo Preference.
"United States maritime policy has effectively kept the U.S. from employing the ~8st
economical factors of production • . . "
"Despite all the legislation affecting the
nation's maritime interests adopted during
its 200-year history, the United Stat~s
still lacks a national cargo policy." I
"Policies have fallen short of the legislative objective of having a U.S. fleet
which carries a substantial portion of
the U.S. foreign trade and provides an
adequate, well-balanced fleet fpr national
defense and national security."42
"A national cargo policy should define
clearly what the government could and
would do to work with American shippers
and U.S. flag lines in order to give
preference to U.S. flag ships, providing
freight rates and service are at least
comparable to those offered by foreign
shipping lines. ,,43
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TABLE 3
U.S. OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE/COMMERCIAL CARGO CARRIED
TbNNAGE (Millions)

1947

1948

1949

1950

1951

1952

1953

1954

1955

142.2

139·0

133.2

117.5

193.1

187.9

178.0

177.0

226.2

U.S. FLAG TONS

81.9

67.0

60.0

49.7

76.8

64.4

51.7

48.7

53·1

PERCENT OF TOTAL

57.6

48.2

45.2

42.3

39.8

34.3

29.1

27.5

23·5

19.57 _ 1958
289.3
253.3

_ 1959
267.0

_ 1960
227.9

1961
272.~

1962
296.8

1963
311.6

1964
332.8

CALENDAR YEAR
TOTAL TONS

CALENDAR YEAR
TOTAL TONS

1256
260.1

U.S. FLAG TONS

53.9

50.8

30.9

27.1

31.0

26.3

29.6

28.5

30.5

PERCENT OF TOTAL

20.7

17.6

12.2

10.2

11.1

9.7

10.0

9.2

9·2

CALENDAR' YEAR
TOTAL TONS

1~

~267

371.3

1966
392.3

387.6

1968
418.6

_ 1969
427.5

_ 1970
473.2

_ 1921
457.4

1972
513.6

1973
631.6

U.S. FLAG TONS

27.7

26.2

20.5

25.0

19.8

25.2

24.4

23.8

39·9

7.5

6.7

5.3

6.0

4.6

5.3

5.3

4.6

6.3

CALENDAR YEAR
TOTAL TONS

1974__
628.9

1975 _
615.6

1976
698.8

1971
775.3

1978
775.6

1979
823.1

1980
772.2

U. S. FLAG TONS

40.9

31.4

33.8

34.8

32.1

35.0

28.2

_ 4.5_

4.1

4.2

3.7

PERCENT OF TOTAL

PERCENT OF TOTAL
Source:

_

_

6.~_

5.Q

_~.8_

U.S. Maritime Administration annual reports.
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The lack of policy and well-defined goals has prevented
federal aid from succeeding.

It is one thing to support the

merchant marine by being generous with financial assistance,
but if that assistance has no direction or aim it is tantamount to throwing money away.

"Easy money" has a way of

working against itself in that it, "basically discourages
high risk and imaginative operations, and does not include
any kind of incentives. ,,44

If Cargo Preference is to be

successful as an aid, it must be consistently practiced in a
goal-oriented fashion.
Restrictive regulations provide another reason why the
U.S. Merchant Marine cannot hope to compete with foreign
shipping.

There are so many restrictions and agencies en-

forcing them that the merchant marine is unable to carryon
those very practices which have ensured the growth of the
foreign industry.

"It is logical that the fewer restraints

imposed on such trade, the greater the volume that would be
available for movement by oceangoing shipping. ,,45

True,

Cargo Preference is an artificial influence on the freemarket system and our domestic laws do not encourage this,
but it must be restated that international shipping is not
really free.
The major pro~lem that federal aid has caused is the
almost complete dependence of the U.S. Merchant Marine on
such aid for its existence.

It is ironic that in attempt-

ing to promote the growth of the maritime industry, federal
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aid and regulation has had the opposite effect in that, "to
the extent that a viable merchant marine is the goal, a
fleet dependent upon subsidy, preference, and protection is
its antithesis. ,,46

Unfortunately, in our system of govern-

ment and with our standards of living, there is virtually no
way the U.S. Merchant Marine can exist without federal aid,
especially in the form of Cargo Preference.
"A well-balanced merchant marine and a
prosperous innovative maritime industry
are considered vital components of U.S.
seapower. However, U.S. shipping continues to experience substantially
higher operating and capital costs than
its foreign competitors. Over a prolonged period this competition has led
to a general decline in the capability
of the U.S. Merchant Marine. The
Congress has attempted to foster development and encourage maintenance of the U.S.
Merchant Marine through ~assage of cargo
preference legislation." 7
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THE IMPORTANCE OF CARGO PREFERENCE

"The cargo preference system is the
principal form of federal assistance
to the U,S merchant shipping
industry." 48
In defining Cargo Preference it was stated that the unsubsidized sector of the merchant marine was totally dependent on government-generated cargo while the subsidized
sector was dependent for a large part of its cargo,

Simply

stated, without Cargo Preference the unsubsidized fleet
would cease to

exist with few exceptions and the subsidized

fleet would be seriously hurt.

Though preference cargo

accounts for only a small fraction of the total volume of
all U.S. imports/exports, it accounts for over 80% of outbound
U.S. oceanborne cargo shipments. 49
Due to the size of our merchant marine, the allotted
percentage of preference cargo cannot always be carried by
U.S. ships.

This leaves a rather generous portion of government-generated cargo for foreign vessels. 5 0 Since, "our cargo
preference requirements, unlike those of many other countries,
do not affect purely commercial cargoes,,,5 1 there is still a
vast cargo resource.

Cargoes which have been affected by

Cargo Preference laws are listed in Table 4.
The benefits to be derived from Cargo Preference are
essentially the same as those discussed Qn Chapter II.

In

Table 5, estimates of benefit/cost figures are presented
from 1958 to 1967 which cast a favorable light on the U.S.
Merchant Marine.

Presently, the benefit/cost ratio is more

likely to be closer to unity using the same methodology,
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TABLE 4
MAJOR GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED CARGOES
Public Law 664 Cargoes:
OTHER AGENCIES (PAST):
Shipper
Inter-American Development
Action
Bank
Board of International Broadcasting
Peace Corps
Agency for International Development
General Services
Loans and Grants
Administration
P.L. 480-Title II
u.S. Information Agency
Department of Agriculture
(now I.C .A.)
P.L. 480-Title I
Other Agriculture Programs
Drug Enforcement
Administrat ion
Department of Commerce
Industry and Trade Administration
Ecological Survey
Maritime Administration
Environmental Protection
Other Agencies
Agency
Department of Defense
Federal Aviation
Military Assistance Program
Administration
Foreign Military Sales Credit
Corps of Engineers-NEGEV
International Exchange
Department of Energy
Service
Bonneville Power Administration
Smithsonian Institution
Strategic Petroleum Reserve
U.S. Travel Service
Department of Health and Human
Services
Department of the Interior
Bureau of Reclamation
Other Agencies
Department of Justice
National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
Tennessee Valley Authority
Department of the Treasury
Chrysler Corporation
Other Agencies
Department of Transportation
Federal Highway Administration
Urban Mass Transportation Administration
Other Agencies
International Communications Agency
Department of State
Sinai Support Mission
Foreign Building Office
Other Agencies (does not include AID)
Other Agencies
Public Resolution 17 Cargoes:
Source: Maritime Administration Annual
Reports
Export-Import Bank
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TABLE 5
Benefit/Cost Analysis of the U.S.
Merchant Marines 1958-1967
(Dollars in Millions)

Year

Benefits
Balance of
Payments

1967
1966
1965
1964
1963
1962
1961
1960
1959
1958

$999
912
632
680
631
659
551
715
748
758

Total

$7,285

Costs*
National
Security+
$400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400

$4,000

Rate
Preferencet

Net
Ship Exchange
Total
Benefits
Programt

Total

ODS

$1,399
1,312
1,032
1,080
1,031
1,059
951
1,115
1,148
1,158

$2Zf.6
199
185
204
192
178
167
163
159
141

$68
76
68
77
79
59
50
54
37
31

$64
44
38
52
47
32
12
12

$1,806

$599

$11,285

--

$348
319
291
333
318
269
231
229
196
172

$1,051
993
741
747
713
790
720
886
952
986

$301

$2,706

$8,579

--

* CDS has been omitted from costs because it is a
subsidy solely to shipyards.
+ Average per year; does not reflect nonquantifiable "availability" factor.
t Indirect subsidies.
Source: Barker, J.R. and Brandwein, Robert. The United States Merchant Marine in
National Perspective.
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because the costs associated with Cargo Preference are
significantly higher now.

It is considerably easier to

present cost estimates in this case than it is to present
estimates for benefits which are largely non-quantifiable.
The costs will now be examined so
Cargo Preference can be proposed.
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thata~eans

of improving

COSTS OF CARGO PREFERENCE
Practically all of the costs associated with Cargo Preference come as a result of the practice of rate preference.
These costs occur because of the higher-than-world market
rates that the unsubsidized merchant fleet is required to
charge for its services (about twice the rate foreign flag
vessels charge for government-generated cargo.)52

The U.S.

taxpayer, shipper, and consumer end up sharing the burden of
the costs of Cargo Preference.

These costs are appreciable

totalling about $5 billion between 1952 and 1972, making
Cargo Preference the most expensive form of federal assistance. 5 3

In Table 6, Gerald Jantscher's estimates of the costs

of Cargo Preference are presented.

Table 7 exhibits the break-

down for the Military Sealift Command costs and current figures
are added to demonstrate the fact that the price tag for Cargo
Preference is getting bigger all the time.

Figure 1 illus-

trates the nature of the growth of the costs of federal aid
from 1954 through 1967 with Cargo Preference accounting for the
largest portion.
The cost differential caused by rate preference has
several undesirable effects.

The Department of Defense, by

far the largest consumer of U.S. flag shipping,54 pays approximately twice as much for shipping on unsubsidized vessels as
it would pay for foreign shipping. 55

For shipments under

P.L. 480, the additional costs for shipping on U.S. vessels
are not paid by the foreign buyer, but are in fact absorbed
by the shipper, producer, and taxpayer. 56 As a result of this,
the general price level for all a producer's goods is likely
to increase. 5 7
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TABLE 6
COST OF CARGO PREFERENCE
Estimate of
Cargo Preference Cost
$3.8 Billion

Program or Agency
Military Sealift Command

Time Period
1952 to 1972

Public Law 480, Title I, Food
for Peace Sales Program

1955 to June 1971

840.1 Million

Public Law 480, Title II, Food
for Peace Donations

1954 to 1972

125.0 Million

Foreign Aid Cargoes-AID Loans and Grants

1948 to 1970

600.0 Million

Source:

Jantscher, Gerald R.

Bread Upon the Waters:
Maritime Industries.
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Federal Aids to the

TABLE 7
Commerical Payments by Military Sealift Command
for Space Aboard Liners and Charter of Vessels, and
Imputed Cargo Preference Laws Subsidy, Fiscal Years
1952-72, Plus-Calculations for Fiscal Years 1979-82
Millions of Dollars
Commercial Payments
For space
aboard liners
141.·4

Fiscal
Year

1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
Total

For charter
of vessels

172.8
146.5
142.5
150·9
177.6
174.9
179.6
163.0
153.0
189.2
203.2
204.9
202.1
261.8
300.9
317.7
366.1
343.9
306.9

250.0
253.8
163.9
66.2
58.7
37.4
43.0
63.1
54.5
61.8
84.3
82.7
88.9
90.1
255.9
371.6
479.3
480.3
435.2
340.9

305.4

4,610.2
. Source:

Fiscal Year

Total

198.7
213.3
155.2
104.3
104.8
107.5
108.9
121.3
108.7
1.01.4
136.8
143.0
146.9
146.1
258.9
294.1
341.3
342.7
279.5
201.2

315 ~o

397.4
426.6
310.3
208.7
209.6
215.0
217.8
242.6
217·5
214.8
273.6
285.9
293.8
292.2
517.7
672.5
797.0
846.4
779.1
647.9
620.4

4,076.4

8,686.7

3,796.3

175.8

Jantscher, Gerald R. Bread Upon the Waters. Federal Aids
to the Maritime Industries.
Imputed SUbsidy
Total
UsingJ~t~cher's
Methodology

1979
1980
1981
1982

817.0
1,068.3
1,253.1
1,433.0
Source:

Imputed subsidy
due to cargo
preference laws

408.5
534.2
626.6
716.5

Defense Transportation Journal, years 1980 thru 1983.
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Route preference does have an effect on the costs
associated with subsidized shipping that should also be considered.

There is no real way of measuring the effects, but

it may inferred that the presence of guaranteed cargo for a
U.S. member of a liner conference will tend to cause that
member to price his services in an oligopolistic or even monopolistic fashion. 58

With Cargo Preference as a backup, the

liner conference member can hold out for higher conference
rates.
other less quantifiable costs of Cargo Preference may provide the strongest argument against the practice of rate preference.

First and most important is the fact that rate pre-

ference provides no incentive for the unsubsidized fleet to
modernize or increase productivity.
and inefficient fleet. 59
waste.

This guarantees an aging

Rate preference also tends to cause

Because cargo is assured, the demand for space on ships

having rate preference is less elastic and all available space
might not be utilized. 60 On the other hand, there are simply
not enough bulk and tanker vessels left in the unsubsidized
sector to carryall of the preference cargo allotted. 61 Perhaps the most shameful waste results as the Military Sealift
Command uses less of its chartered vessels in order to support
privately-owned and operated shipping. 62 With all of the costs
and waste associated with U.S. flag shipping, potential
customers-given the option-will logically choose foreign
flag shipping.

Further, the costs of "shipping American"

may influence potential foreign buyers to decide against
"buying American. ,,63
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Given all the costs

of Cargo Preference and the limited

tangible benefits, how is it possible to defend the
practice?

Though most of the arguments in favor of Cargo

Preference have been discounted, it is impossible to fully
discount the value of the U.S. Merchant Marine as a vital
element in our national defense.

The decline of our

country's international stature and economic dominance has
gone hand in hand with the decline of the merchant marine.
Without Cargo Preference (especially in the form of route
preference) the U.S. Merchant Marine would lose its strongest form of support.

Cargo Preference could of course use

some improvement to ensure that the necessary sacrifice
does not become too great.
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v.

THE FUTWE OF CARGO PREFERENCE

Cargo Preference has been described as a "less politically objectionable,,64 form of federal aid.

The costs

of Cargo Preference are off-budget costs which, though
appreciable, are not as acutely felt as direct subsidies.
Most of the rhetoric generated against the practice originates from concerns which have foreign interests excluded
from the U.S. preference trade.

Clever foreign lobbying

and use of this country's own laws and regulations has influenced even domestic concerns to take up the fight against
Cargo Preference.

Paradoxically, the foreign interests are

not about to relinquish their own Cargo Preference provisions.
Unlike our own system of government which allows even hostile
foreign nations to exert direct pressure through lobbying and
other means on our policymaking process, foreign nations do
not generally allow other nations to voice their conflicting
opinions so effectively.
Recently, the Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences proposed by UNCTAD has forced the U.S. to think in an international way about Cargo Preference.

The "cargo sharing" pro-

visions of this code would imply that all but military preference cargo would be eliminated in favor of a more balanced
trade. 65

The U.S. does not currently intend to accept the

Code, although the Code is really a more favorable form of
Cargo Preference for the U.S. in that the 40-40-20 cargo
sharing formula covers all cargo including commercial cargoes
not covered by our domestic Cargo Preference law.

This means

that 40% of all liner conference trade between ourselves and
another country would be reserved for U.S. flag vessels-which
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is a great deal more than is currently carried.

This

would provide an incentive for the U.S. to build more ships
and employ more personnel to handle the increased trade.
Therefore, the UNCTAD Code is in fact another type of Cargo
Preference which could benefit the U.S.

Since the U.S. will

not become party to the Code, it will have to rely on domestic
Cargo Preference laws to protect its interests.
It is likely that the U.S. will not increase the extent
of its Cargo Preference laws due to political pressure.

For

the same reasons, the laws will not be diminished either.
Though there are occasional signs of hope, jUdging from past
performance things will change as slowly as before.

Nonetheless,

proposals to improve our merchant marine are always welcome,
though sometimes a bit idealistic.
Proposals for the future of Cargo Preference have included the total or partial elimination of Cargo Preference,
the increase of Cargo Preference, the allowance of foreign
building with Cargo Preference privileges, the offering of
Cargo Preference to only the unsubsidized sector, and the
creation of performance-based subsidies.

Each of these pro-

posals alone will not accomplish the goal of a strong merchant
marine.

The best solution could be a hybrid of these suggestions.

In treating each proposal singly the best and the worst
features of each are highlighted.
Total or partial elimination Cargo Preference means all
or some of the merchant marine will suffer.

Elimination of

rate preference will cause the unsubsidized sector to lose
its bread and butter.

Rate preference, however, is the weakest
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aspect of Cargo Preference and could be removed with the
least amount of damage, due to the already decrepit state of
the unsubsidized fleet.

Extension of subsidies to vital com-

ponents of the unsubsidized fleet could fill the void left by
the elimination of rate preference.

Route preference, on the

other hand, has to be maintained to ensure cargo for the encouragement of maintaining any fleet at all.
The increase of Cargo Preference is, as stated previously,
not a popular or practical idea:

in the U.S. today.

This

would entail costs so great that the merchant marine might
price itself out of existence.
centive inherent in this method.

Further, there is no inPerhaps a stepped increase

in route preference toa particular company based on performance
and the importance of the route would be more acceptable.
Recently foreign building was revived as an issue and is
now a fact with which the U.S. Merchant Marine will have to
abide.

With foreign building, the existing fleet will have

increased cheaper competition which will be eligible to receive Cargo Preference benefits.
several reasons.

This is actually good for

First the competition and the availability

of cheaper, more efficient shipping should cause some activity
in the merchant marine.

Secondly, the U.S. will be able to

carry more of its preference cargo and commercial trade,
favorably affecting the balance of payments.

Finally, some

U.S. owners of flag-of-convenience vessels could be influenced to rejoin the U.S. fleet adding immeasurably to the
existing fleet.

The only drawbacks to foreign building are
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the problems it causes for U.S. shipyards which need to be
maintained at least for defense purposes.
One of the issues in the Cargo Preference debates was
The practice of "double sUbsidy,"

It has been proposed that

Cargo Preference should only be offered to unsubsidized
operators.

The removal of preference cargo from the sub-

sidized sector would be detrimental to its profitability and
could discourage expansion or modernization if no cargo was
assured.

Proportional reductions in subsidy or repayments for

"double subsidy" vessels seems more practical.
The creation of performance-based subsidies appears to be
an excellent idea.

The stagnant nature of the U.S. Merchant

Marine has been caused by the lack of incentive and the presence of a continuous flow of' "no-strings" aid.

Forcing the

merchant marine to work for the aid it receives is logical,
provides tangible incentive for growth and technological
development, and is much less costly.
A realistic proposal for aiding the U.S. Merchant Marine
should include aspects of all the previous proposals and more.
It is my opinion that the eventual elimination of rate preference (with direct subsidy for vital tanker/bulk operators),
a performance-based extension of route preference, allowance
of a preset quota of foreign building, reduction or repayment
of "double sUbsidy" benefits, removal of most

u.S.

restrictive

regUlations, and formation of a strong and definitive

u.S.

maritime policy would go a long way towards the recuperation
of the U.S. Merchant Marine.

I also believe the proposal

would be acceptable toa.greater cross-section of government
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and industry because it incurs less costs, requires less
government intervention, and inspires the kind of
competition that encourages growth.
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CONCLUSION
Cargo Preference, like any other form of federal aid,
has its associated costs and drawbacks.

It could stand

extensive "tailoring" to the real needs of the U.S.
Merchant Marine, but it most definitely is necessary to
ensure the survival of the U.S. flag merchant fleet at
this time.

Until a major restructuring of the merchant

marine occurs and we assume a more objective view of the
intrinsic value of this resource, the costs will be high
and the industry will continue to depend on artificial
assistance.

The task before is to arrive at a maritime

policy that is capable of fostering effective support
for our once proud and tradition-filled U.S. Merchant
Marine.
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